HttpSig is a simple but very efficient authentication protocol extending [Signing HTTP Messages](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/) RFC by defining — * a `WWW-Authenticate: HttpSig` header for servers to return to the client with a 401 or 402, * an `Authorization: HttpSig` method the client can use in response with two optional attributes `webid` and `cert` (todo) the first one taking `https` URLs and the second taking `https` or `DID` URLs, * a requirement to interpret the `keyid` attribute of the `Signature-Input` header defined in [Signing HTTP Messages](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/) as a URI when used with the `WWW-Authenticate: HttpSig` header, * the ability to use absolute or relative URLs in both paces mentioned above, * allow relative URLs passed by the client to the server to refer to resources on the client using a [P2P Extension to HTTP](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-benfield-http2-p2p-02) which would allow authentication over a single HTTP connection.
## Introduction ... ### Terminology ... ### Namespaces ...
### Conformance This section describes the conformance model. #### Normative and Informative Content {#normative-informative-content} All assertions, diagrams, examples, and notes are non-normative, as are all sections explicitly marked non-normative. Everything else is normative. The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “SHOULD”, and “MAY” are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The key words “strongly encouraged”, “strongly discouraged”, “encouraged", “discouraged", “can", “cannot”, “could”, “could not”, “might”, and “might not” are used for non-normative content. #### Specification Category .... #### Classes of Products .... #### Interoperability ....
## Signing HTTP Messages [Signing HTTP Messages](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/) is an IETF RFC Draft worked on by the HTTP WG, whose purpose is to allow the signing of HTTP messages, be they requests or responses. *Signing Messages* is based on [draft-cavage-http-signature-12](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cavage-http-signatures-12), which evolved and gained adoption since 2013, and had a [large number of implementations](https://github.com/w3c-dvcg/http-signatures/issues/1). The IETF spec does depart in important ways from the previous work, building on [RFC 8941: Structured Header Fields](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8941#section-4.1.1.2) and dropping the authentication feature which we are adding back here. *Signing Messages* is a lightweight extension to the HTTP protocol. As such, it has full access to the HTTP layer. In comparison, TLS client authentication being established before the exchange of HTTP messages, does not have access to that layer. As a result, client certificate negotiation in TLS is constrained by the server only being able to list trusted Certificate Authorities. Since `HttpSig` is an extension to *Signing Messages* it can directly access HTTP error codes, `Link` relation headers, and other metadata on a message. As a result, the client can use published access control policies to select among its credentials and use different identities on different requests. For example, a client can start by presenting an adult credential and later one for payment. If the client does not wish the server to link those properties, it would, of course, need to open a new connection. (Note: all communication here is assumed to run over TLS.) The [Signing HTTP Messages](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/) protocol allows a client to authenticate by signing any of several HTTP headers with any one of its private keys. To verify the signature, the server will needs to know the corresponding public key. This information is passed in the form of an opaque string known as a `keyid` (see [§2.3 Signature Parameters](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-17#signature-params)), which enable the server to look up the public key; how this look-up is done is not specified by that protocol. The `HttpSig` protocol extension described here requires the `keyid` string to be interpreted as a URL. This allows the server to discover the public key by [resolving](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-5) the `keyid` URL using standards defined for each URI scheme. `https` URLs present the advantage of being widely used, but `HttpSig` is open to other schemes such as [DID](https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core/)s. ## Extending `Signing HTTP Messages` with `keyid` URLs We first consider the minimal extension of *Signing Messages* with `keyid`'s limited to HTTP urls. We then show how this ties into the Access-Control Protocol used by Solid. ### The Sequence Diagram The minimal extension to [Signing HTTP Messages](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/) can be illustrated by the following Sequence Diagram: ![HttpSig Sequence Diagram](img/HttpSigDiagrams/Sequence.svg) Note that the core extension to "Signing HTTP Messages" occurs in exchange 2 and 3. 1 and 2 are just preparatory moves that set up the context. #### 1. The initial Request In (1) the Resource server answers a request ⓐ, by returning in ⓑ a 401 or 402 response with the `WWW-Authenticate: HttpSig` header. The `WWW-Authenticate` header is specified in §[4.1 of HTTP/1.1](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7235#section-4.1). The `HttpSig` challenge method needs to be defined here (todo) and registered as specified in the [Authentication Scheme Registry](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7235#section-5.1). We illustrate this with the following example. Alice makes a request to a resource `` on her Personal Online Data Store (POD) at ``: ```HTTP GET /comments/ HTTP/1.1 Accept: text/turtle, application/ld+json;q=0.9, */*;q=0.8 ``` The response from the server in 1ⓑ will be similar to the following 
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: HttpSig realm="/comments/"
Accept-Signature: sig1=("@method" "@target-uri");created;nonce
Host: alice.name
Date: Thu, 01 Apr 2021 00:01:03 GMT
Link: <http://www.w3.org/ns/ldp#BasicContainer>; rel=type
Link: <http://www.w3.org/ns/ldp#Resource>; rel=type
Link: </comments/.acl>; rel=acl
* The `Link` header w1 a `rel` value of `acl` works as described in the [Web Access Control](https://solidproject.org/TR/wac) specification [[WAC]]. It is what allows clients making a request on a resource to find out what credentials they need to gain the access they were denied. Without such a `Link` the client would only be able to guess what key to send, leading to the following dilemma: either the client loses privacy by randomly having to present its credentials, allowing the server to correlate those identities, or the client has to resign itself to not accessing resources it is actually entitled to. Presenting the access rules avoids clients having to choose between such unappealing extremes. * `Accept-Signature` header specifies the minimal set of headers that need to be signed. It is defined in [§5.1 The Accept-Signature Field](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-17#section-5.1). (Please provide feedback on which fields should be required in [Discussion 236](https://github.com/solid/authentication-panel/discussions/236)) #### 2. Finding the Access Control Rules After parsing the headers and resolving relative URLs in the Link headers the client finds the effective acl (see [issue 531: defaultAccessContainer Link header](https://github.com/solid/specification/issues/531)). Note: With [HTTP/2 server Push](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-8.2), the server could immediately push the content of the linked-to Access Control document to the client, assuming reasonably that the client would have connected with the key had it known the rules. It may also be possible to send the relevant ACL rules directly in the body of the response (see discussion on [issue 167](https://github.com/solid/authentication-panel/issues/167)) though one would like especially for default rules to be cachable, to reduce the bytes sent in each response. The Access Control rule could be as simple as stating that access will be granted only to requests authenticate using one of a set of keys. More complicated use cases are possible, as described in the [Use Cases and Requirements Document](https://solid.github.io/authorization-panel/authorization-ucr/). #### 3. Client selects fitting Key If the client can find a key that satisfies the Access Control Rules, then it can use the corresponding private key to sign the headers in (3) as specified by [Signing HTTP Messages](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-key/) and pass a link to the key in the `keyid` field as a URL. There may be more than one key that fits and the client may also ask the user which key to use or follow a laid out policy to decide on this. #### 4. The Client Signs the Header In 4 the Client signs the header, and if the Guard can verify the proof the server will allow the action to take place. We will look at the Logic the Guard follows in 5, 6, and 7. Assume that Alice's client, after parsing the Access Control Rules found that `https://alice.name/keys/alice#` satisfies the stated requirements. If Alice allows the client to use that key, the app can create a signing string for the `@request-target` pseudo-header and `authorization` header. The `authorization` header is mandatory to avoid a man in the middle attack (is it really?) that could change the `Authorization` header to point to a different signature. **todo:** below this point all signatures need to be regenerated. First Alice's client builds a pre-signed request, containing an `Authorization` header as shown here: ```HTTP GET /comments/ HTTP/1.1 Authorization: HttpSig proof=sig1 Accept: text/turtle, application/ld+json;q=0.9, */*;q=0.8 ``` This request is used to generate a signing string on the `@request-target` and `authorization` headers: ```text "@request-target": get /comments/ "authorization": HttpSig proof=sig1 "@signature-params": ("@request-target" "authorization");keyid="/keys/alice#";\ created=1617265800;expires=1617320700 ``` After signing the above string with the private key of `` and naming that signature `sig1`, the new HTTP request header looks as follows: ```HTTP GET /comments/ HTTP/1.1 Authorization: HttpSig proof=sig1 Accept: text/turtle, application/ld+json;q=0.9, */*;q=0.8 Signature-Input: sig1=("@request-target" "authorization");keyid="/keys/alice#";\ created=1617265800;expires=1617320700 Signature: sig1=:jnwCuSDVKd8royZnKgm0GBQzLcad4ynATDIrkNkQGHGY6Dd0ftc0MKX88fZwek\ KevNW4N5eky+idEqOsvj+wpxc7xXN7KwnAT0SzGjyj+3CxnVN26er72l1zWDRBxo7IN3raKi0wE\ Oxv7mW2Ms9/VQ4gChyTK+n2zUz+nuly/6cKlJDwqsbb6MDFq88p6OYjx3AFwqlgJvQ5U1RCkZzI\ 1X6P98pE0oY8Z8xu5dtyCwVBVyLXkAdeVlCABA3jdZB/qorSmbEgoQBXVvLsNaVAkAnIGY6sEFv\ j0FZ/90URJSeraJLrHmOhOIwL5T11mIdhmlqLCk4werRFfbfRBTBQ9g==: ``` Notes: * we have encoded the header using [RFC8792](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8792) Single Slash Encoding to fit the longer lines on a page, * the public and private keys are the same as those named `test-key-rsa-pss` given in [Appendix B.1.2 of Message Signatures](https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-04.html#name-example-keys), * the HttpSig Authorization message interprets any `keyid` to be a relative or absolute URI, * in the example above, the `keyid` is a relative URL pointing to a resource on Alice's POD. #### 5. The Guard Authorizes The Guard on the server protecting the resource Authorizes the request in 4 steps: the first two (a) and (b) for Authentication, the second pair (c) and (d) for authorization. ##### (a) The Guard Fetches the `keyid` The main protocol extension from [Signing HTTP Messages](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/) RFC is that of requiring the `keyid` to be a URL, allowing the resource server to retrieve the `keyid` document in (4). The keyid url should be understood to be relative to the response url. In 5a of our example, the Resource Guard on the POD `alice.name` retrieves the resource `` receiving the following [JSON-LD 1.1](https://json-ld.org/) document: ```JSON { "@context": [ "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1", "https://w3id.org/security/suites/jws-2020/v1" ], "id": "#", "controller": "/people/alice#i", "type": "JsonWebKey2020", "publicKeyJwk": { "alg": "PS512", "use": "sig", "warning": "this is the key from https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-13#page-82. Don't use for real world examples, as the private key is public knowledge", "kty": "RSA", "e": "AQAB", "n": "hAKYdtoeoy8zcAcR874L8cnZxKzAGwd7v36APp7Pv6Q2jdsPBRrwWEBnez6d0UDKDwGbc6nxfEXAy5mbhgajzrw3MOEt8uA5txSKobBpKDeBLOsdJKFqMGmXCQvEG7YemcxDTRPxAleIAgYYRjTSd_QBwVW9OwNFhekro3RtlinV0a75jfZgkne_YiktSvLG34lw2zqXBDTC5NHROUqGTlML4PlNZS5Ri2U4aCNx2rUPRcKIlE0PuKxI4T-HIaFpv8-rdV6eUgOrB2xeI1dSFFn_nnv5OoZJEIB-VmuKn3DCUcCZSFlQPSXSfBDiUGhwOw76WuSSsf1D4b_vLoJ10w" } } ``` The server could also return an equivalent [Turtle 1.1](https://www.w3.org/TR/turtle/) representation: 
@prefix security: <https://w3id.org/security#> .
@prefix rdf: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> .

<#> a security:JsonWebKey2020 ;
   security:controller </people/alice#i> ;
   security:publicKeyJwk """{
     "alg": "PS512",
     "warning": "Don't use this key for real world examples, as the private key is publicly known. This is the key from <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-13#page-82>.",
      "use": "sig",
      "kty":"RSA",
      "e":"AQAB",
      "n":"r4tmm3r20Wd_PbqvP1s2-QEtvpuRaV8Yq40gjUR8y2Rjxa6dpG2GXHbPfvMs8ct-Lh1GH45x28Rw3Ry53mm-oAXjyQ86OnDkZ5N8lYbggD4O3w6M6pAvLkhk95AndTrifbIFPNU8PPMO7OyrFAHqgDsznjPFmTOtCEcN2Z1FpWgchwuYLPL-Wokqltd11nqqzi-bJ9cvSKADYdUAAN5WUtzdpiy6LbTgSxP7ociU4Tn0g5I6aDZJ7A8Lzo0KSyZYoA485mqcO0GVAdVw9lq4aOT9v6d-nb4bnNkQVklLQ3fVAvJm-xdDOp9LCNCN48V2pnDOkFV6-U9nV5oyc6XI2w"
   }"""^^rdf:JSON .
(See [issue 156: Ontology for `keyid` document](https://github.com/solid/authentication-panel/issues/156)) Since the `keyid` URL, in our example, is relative, the server will not need to make a new network connection to the outside world. Indeed, here is a list of contexts in which a connection to the internet will not be necessary: * The `keyid` URL points to a resource on the resource server. * The `keyid` URL is a [did:key](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-key/) or did:jwt URL (see [issue 157](https://github.com/solid/authentication-panel/issues/157)). These are URIs that contains in their name all the data of the public key. Since the signing string always contains the `@signature-params` field, this data cannot be altered. * The `keyid` URL refers to an external resource, but the resource server has a fresh cached copy of it, or the URL refers to a `did:...` document stored on some form of blockchain, which the server has access to offline. * The `keyid` is a relative URL on the client, which the server can GET using the P2P extension to HTTP (more on that below). One advantage of using HTTP URLs to refer to keys, is that they allow the client to use HTTP Methods such as `POST` or `PUT` to create keys, as well as `PUT`, `PATCH` and `DELETE` to edit them, helping address the problem of key revocation. ##### (b) verifying the signature Having received the keyId content the Guard can verify that the signature was signed correctly as specified in [HTTP Message Signatures](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures/). ##### (c) the Guard fetches the rules for the resource Next the Guard must fetch the same Access control Resource the client used by following the HTTP headers of the resource. ##### (d) the Guard Authorizes the request Having the Verified ID (or credential) and the rules, the Guard can find out if the Principal has access in the required mode. (see [The Access Control Rules](#the-access-control-rules) below). ## Solid Use Case The Solid Use Case will help us justify why we need identifiers whose visibility is not necessarily tied to just one resource server. We start by noticing that Solid (Social Linked Data) clients are modeled on web browsers. Solid clients are not tied to reading or writing data from one domain; just like web browsers, they can start from a resource located on any server and follow links from there to arrive anywhere else on the web. As a result, Solid Apps cannot know in advance of making a request on a resource, whether authentication will be needed or what credentials will need to be presented. Furthermore, many Solid App users will be keen to create cross-site identities and link them up, in order to join decentralized conversations and build reputations across websites. We can illustrate this by the following diagram showing the topology of the data a solid client may need to read. Starting from Tim Berners-Lee's [WebID](https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/identity/), a client may need to follow the links spanning web servers (represented as boxes). ![TimBLs foaf profile](img/HttpSigDiagrams/WebID-Social.svg) (note: that TimBL's picture is missing in the diagram because of a bug in OmniGraffle conversion to SVG. I have reported the bug to OmniGroup.) Starting from one resource, such as TimBL's WebID, a client should be able to follow links to other resources, some of which will be protected in various ways, requiring different forms of proof. ### The `keyid` URL When used with `HttpSig` all `keyid` parameters are to be interpreted as URLs. By extending the first complete example from of the *Message Signing* RFC, in [§2.4](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-17#section-2.4) with an `Authorization:L HttpSig` header allows the server to determine that the location of the key is at the URL `/test-key-rsa-pss` on the server. ```HTTP POST /foo?param=Value&Pet=dog HTTP/1.1 Authorization: HttpSig proof=sig2 Host: example.com Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 02:07:55 GMT Content-Type: application/json Content-Digest: sha-512=:WZDPaVn/7XgHaAy8pmojAkGWoRx2UFChF41A2svX+T\ aPm+AbwAgBWnrIiYllu7BNNyealdVLvRwEmTHWXvJwew==: Content-Length: 18 Signature-Input: sig1=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "@query" \ "content-digest" "content-type" "content-length")\ ;created=1618884475;keyid="test-key-rsa-pss" Signature: sig1=:mZuBiiKDzg+s8eJiMYc0GwSkyurjSbPX7xSKpYe7EcfolW3DUF\ RjlpneJoDkt5zNZo3N5tjn1e0sZZlBbrhHPhD9aQtE/qJPHrjwLUOY9eYtUWw261F\ Xxpp2Dsqa9jeE1r0or4TGalZnEiNl5cNFv7ze8ox5G6TNNyam/3GeB2N8t8P56XOG\ 03g50CsN/4QZGWs4AjJcD5gMzcQhq/9JoKDUJDbcEyIetxEYvQCjWKbSb4yBevGmY\ PWJ2ezfIFiwmUuvrs/Ab9tYzIjEw1hHP70RF67HSazjT+YsI2y5jpzjx8SerihGSN\ Qwr57yQaTt4vK1eRDL2758LnsEYtO8lg==: ``` It also allows for absolute URLs referring to `keyid` documents located elsewhere on the web, such as the requestor's [Freedom Box](https://freedombox.org): ```HTTP Signature-Input: sig1=(); keyid="https://alice.freedombox/keys/test-key-a"; created=1402170695 Signature: sig1=:cxieW5ZKV9R9A70+Ua1A/1FCvVayuE6Z77wDGNVFSiluSz...==: ``` It also allows key-based DID URLs as described in [issue 217 of the Solid Spec](https://github.com/solid/specification/issues/217#issuecomment-777509084). In order to allow relative URLs to refer to resources on the client, as made possible by the [Peer-to-Peer Extension to HTTP/2 draft](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-benfield-http2-p2p-02) (see discussed on the [ietf-http-wg mailing list](https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/2021JanMar/0049.html)) the `Authorization` header can be enhanced with a `clientUrl` parameter. Here is an example of a header sent by a client to the server with such a URL: ```HTTP Authorization: HttpSig proof=sig3, clientUrl=true Signature-Input: sig3=(); keyid="/keys/test-key-a"; created=1402170695 Signature: sig3=:cxieW5ZKV9R9A70+Ua1A/1FCvVayuE6Z77wDGNVFSiluSzR9TYFV ``` On receiving such a signed header, the server would know that it can request the key by making an HTTP `GET` request on the given relative URL on the client using the same connection but after switching client/server roles. This would reduce to a minimum the reliance on the network. ### The `keyid` Document The `keyid` is a URL that refers to a key. An example key would be: `https://bob.example/keys/2019-09-02#k1` The URL without the hash refers to the `keyid` document, which can be dereferenced. In the above example, the `keyid` document is `https://bob.example/keys/2019-09-02`. For the [Solid](https://solid-project.org/) use cases, the `keyid` document must contain a description of the public key in an RDF format. Following discussion in [issue 156: Ontology for `keyid` document](https://w3id.org/security/v1) and in order to maximise interoperability with the Web Credentials community, the document has to use the [security-vocab](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/security-vocab/#challenge). The server must present both [Turtle](https://www.w3.org/TR/turtle/) and [JSON-LD](https://json-ld.org) formats. This format embeds a JSON Literal for the key as specified by [RFC 7517: JSON Web Key (JWK)](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517) into the RDF. An example `keyid` document was given with Alice's `keyid` document above. ### Which headers should be signed? This is a topic which would be best informed from experience in the field. See [discussion 236: What HttpSig headers should be signed?](https://github.com/solid/authentication-panel/discussions/236). ### The Access Control Rules How can the client know which key to present? We illustrate this with a few examples building on [Web Access Control](https://solidproject.org/TR/wac) [[WAC]]. In the simplest case, a Web Access Control rule document linked to from the `Link:` header of the resource the client received a `401` from, can specify a set of agents by describing their relation to a public key. 
@prefix  acl:  <http://www.w3.org/ns/auth/acl#>.
@prefix cert: <http://www.w3.org/ns/auth/cert#> .

<#authorization1>
    a             acl:Authorization;
    acl:accessTo  <https://alice.example/docs/shared-file1>;
    acl:mode      acl:Read,
                  acl:Write;
    acl:agent   [ cert:key  ],
                <did:key:z6MkiTBz1ymuepAQ4HEHYSF1H8quG5GLVVQR3djdX3mDooWp>,
    [ cert:key <https://iama.star/love/me/key#i> ] .
Instead of listing agents individually in the ACL, they can be listed as belonging to a group 
<#authorization1>
    a             acl:Authorization;
    acl:accessTo  <https://alice.example/docs/shared-file1>;
    acl:mode      acl:Read,
                  acl:Write,
                  acl:Control;
    acl:agentGroup <https://alice.example.com/work-groups#Accounting> .
The agent Group document located at `https://alice.example.com/work-groups` can describe the users in various ways including by `keyid` as in this example 
<#Accounting>
    a                vcard:Group;
    # Accounting group members:
    vcard:hasMember  [ cert:key </keys/2019-09-02#k1> ],
         [ cert:key <https://iama.star/love/me/key#i> ],
                     <did:key:z6MkiTBz1ymuepAQ4HEHYSF1H8quG5GLVVQR3djdX3mDooWp> .
The Group resource can itself be access controlled to be only visible to members of the Group. ## Extending the Protocol with Credentials We now look at how the protocol can be extended beyond possession of a key to proving attributes based on a Credential. ### Protocol Extension for Credentials A Credential is a document describing certain properties of an agent. It can be a [WebID](https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/) or a [Verifiable Credential](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/). We can refer to such a document using a URL. If the Access Control Rule linked to in (2) specifies that only agents that can prove a certain property can access the resource, and the agent has such credentials in its [Universal Wallet](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/universal-wallet-interop-spec/), the agent can choose the right credentials depending on the user's policies on privacy or security. If the policies do not give a clear answer, the user agent will need to ask the user -- at that time or later, but in any case before engaging in the request (3) - to confirm authenticated access. Having selected a Credential, this can be passed in the response in (3) to the server by adding a `Authorization: HttpSig` header with as `cred` attribute value a relative or absolute URL enclosed in `<` and `>` referring to that credential. ```HTTP GET /comments/c1 HTTP/1.1 Authorization: HttpSig proof=sig1, cred="<https://alice.freedom/cred/BAEng>" Signature-Input: sig1=(); keyid="<https://alice.freedom/keys/alice-key-eng>"; created=1402170695 Signature: sig1=:cxieW5ZKV9R9A70+Ua1A/1FCvVayuE6Z77wDGNVFSiluSzR9TYFV vwUjeU6CTYUdbOByGMCee5q1eWWUOM8BIH04Si6VndEHjQVdHqshAtNJk2Quzs6WC 2DkV0vysOhBSvFZuLZvtCmXRQfYGTGhZqGwq/AAmFbt5WNLQtDrEe0ErveEKBfaz+ IJ35zhaj+dun71YZ82b/CRfO6fSSt8VXeJuvdqUuVPWqjgJD4n9mgZpZFGBaDdPiw pfbVZHzcHrumFJeFHWXH64a+c5GN+TWlP8NPg2zFdEc/joMymBiRelq236WGm5VvV 9a22RW2/yLmaU/uwf9v40yGR/I1NRA==: ``` As before, we reserve the option to enclose a relative URL in `>` and `<` to refer to a client side resource, accessible by the server using a P2P extension of HTTP (see [Peer-to-Peer Extension to HTTP/2 draft](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-benfield-http2-p2p-02)). (Todo: how else can one pass the Credential?). ```text Client Resource keyid Credential App Server Doc Doc | | | | |-(1) request URL --------------------->| | | |<-------------(2) 401 + WWW-Auth Sig | | | | + Link acl header --| | | | | | | |-(2) request ACR --------------------->| | | |<-------------------(2a) 200 ACR doc --| | | | | | | | (select cert and key) | | | | | | | |-(3) HTTP Sig header------------------>| | | | initial auth | | | | verification | | | | | | | | |-(4) GET keyid--------->| | | |<--------(4a) keyid doc-| | | | | | verify sig | | | | | | |-(5) GET credential---------------->| | |<---------------(5a) credential Doc-| | | | WAC verification | | | |<-----------------(3a) send content----| ``` Exchange 4, where the server retrieves a (cached) copy of the key, are as before. Exchange 5 to fetch the Credential document can run in parallel with 4. And the result sent in 5a can also can be cached. If the `Credential` header URL * is enclosed in '<' and '>' then * if it is relative it can be fetched on the same server * if is is an absolute URL it can be fetched by opening a new connection * is enclosed in `>` and `<` and P2P HTTP extension is enabled, the server can request the credential from the client directly using the same connection opened in (3) exactly as above. Note that if a client uses a P2P Connection to fetch a `>/cred1<` Credential and the client is authenticated with a `did:key:23dfs` then the server may be able to store that Credential at the `did:key:23dfs/cred1` URL in its cache. (todo: think it through) ### Linking a WebKey to a WebID We start by illustrating this with a very simple example: that of authentication by [WebID](https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/identity/). Here we consider a [WebID Document](https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/identity/#publishing-the-webid-profile-document) profile document to be a minimal credential - minimal in so far as it does not even need to be signed. The signature comes from the TLS handshake required to fetch an `https` signed document placed at the location of the URL. ### WebID and `keyid` documents are the same The simplest deployment is for the WebID document to be the same as the `keyid` document. For example Alice's `WebID` and `keyid` documents could be `https://alice.example/card` and return a representation with the following triples: 
<#me> a foaf:Person;
    foaf:name "Alice";
    cert:key <#key1> .

<#key1> a cert:RSAPublicKey;
        cert:modulus "00cb25da76..."^^xsd:hexBinary;
        cert:exponent 65537 .
By signing the HTTP header with the private key corresponding to the public key published at `` the client proves that it is the referrent of `` according to the description of the WebID Profile Document. This can be used for people or institutions that are happy to have public global identifiers to identify them. One advantage is that the `keyid` document being the same as the WebID Profile document, the verification step requests (4) and (5) get collapsed into one request. It also allows each individual user to maintain their profile and keys by hosting it on their server. This allows friends to link to it, creating a [friend of a friend](http://www.foaf-project.org) decentralized social network. A certain amount of anonymity can be regained by placing those servers behind Tor, using `.onion` URLs, and access controlling linked to documents that contain more personal information. WebIDs allow servers to protect resources by listing WebIDs as shown in the [Groups of Agents](https://solid.github.io/web-access-control-spec/#describing-agents) description of the Web Access Control specification. Because the keys are controlled by the users, they can update them regularly, especially if they suspect a private key may have been compromised. Authors of such ACLs can evaluate the trust they put in such a WebID by the position it has in their Web of Trust (i.e. which other people they trust link to it). Access Control Lists can be extended by rules giving access to friends of a friend, extended family networks, ... (this is still being worked on) WebIDs are also useful for institutions wishing to be clearly identified when signing a [Verifiable Credential](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/), such as a Birth Certificate or Drivers License Authority signing a claim, a University or School signing that a user has received a degree, ... ### WebID and `keyid` documents are different When WebID and `keyid` documents are different this allows the key to be used without tying it to a WebID, and for that key to be used to sign other credentials. It can also be useful in that the container where keys are placed can have less strict access control rules that the WebID profile, giving various software agents access to them. In this case the WebID could link to the hash of the key, or some other proof that does not require it linking to the key. ### Credentials Resources can describe in the linked-to `accessControl` document a class of agents, specified by attribute, who may access the resource in a given mode. For example, ISO could publish an [OWL](https://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview/) document at `https://iso.org/ont/People`, describing the set of people over 21, using an example from the [OWL2-Primer](https://www.w3.org/TR/2012/REC-owl2-primer-20121211/#a_DatatypeRestriction). 
<#Over21> owl:equivalentClass [  a owl:Restriction;
      owl:onProperty :hasAge ;
      owl:someValuesFrom
          [ rdf:type   rdfs:Datatype ;
            owl:onDatatype       xsd:integer ;
            owl:withRestrictions (  [ xsd:minExclusive  21 ] )
          ]
       ] .
This would allow resources to be protected with a rule such as 
<#adultPermission>
          :accessToClass :AdultContent;
          :agentClass iso:Over21 ;
          :mode :Read .
After receiving the response (2) in the above sequence diagram, a client can search for the relevant [Verifiable Credential](https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/) in its [Universal Wallet](https://w3c-ccg.github.io/universal-wallet-interop-spec/) (containing perhaps a Drivers License, Birth certificate, and MI7 007 license to kill), order these in a privacy lattice, and choose the one most appropriate for the task at hand. The URL for that Credential can then be sent in the header (3). Here is an example that would work over an HTTP/2 connection enabled with a P2P extension. The client tells the server to find the certificate in its local store at `/certs/YearOfBirth`. The server could then resolve that relative URL to `` and check its cache for a valid cert. If none is present, it would need to request one from the client on the same P2P connection at `/certs/YearOfBirth/`. ```HTTP GET /comments/c1 HTTP/2 Authorization: HttpSig cred=">/certs/YearOfBirth<" . Signature-Input: sig1=(); keyid="did:key:z6MkiTBz1ymuepAQ4HEHYSF1H8quG5GLVVQR3djdX3mDooWp"; created=1402170695 ``` The Server Guard then needs to verify that the signature is correct, that the credential identifies the user with the same key, and that it is signed by a legitimate Certificate Authority entitled to make Claims about age. How to determine which Certificate Authority are legitimate for which claims, is outside the scope of this specification. This is known in the Self-Sovereign Identity space as a Governance Framework, and will potentially require a [Web of Nations](https://co-operating.systems/2020/06/01/WoN.pdf).